Consciousness is integrated information (IIT)
A system is conscious to the degree that it possesses integrated information (Φ); experience is identical to a maximally irreducible cause–effect structure.
2 open contradictions
- Evidential: These hypotheses draw opposite conclusions from the same evidence. Conflicts with Reality is fundamentally physical.
- Evidential: These hypotheses draw opposite conclusions from the same evidence. Conflicts with Consciousness is not reducible to physical processes.
Evidence balance
Supporting
2- Integrated Information Theoryw70
Tononi, Boly, Massimini & Koch · 2016 · Peer-reviewed
IIT is the formal statement of this hypothesis.
- Neural correlates of consciousnessw40
Crick & Koch · 1998 · Peer-reviewed
Neural correlates are broadly consistent with integration measures.
Opposing
1- The physical basis of mind (Crick)w35
Francis Crick · 1994 · Book
A purely neuronal reductive program need not invoke Φ.
Assumptions
Integrated information is necessary and sufficient for experience
unjustified
Φ is well-defined and measurable for real systems
unjustified — Currently intractable at scale.
Open questions within this hypothesis
- Do high-Φ but behaviorally inert systems have experience?
- Can Φ be estimated for biological brains?
Falsification criteria
Finding conscious systems with low Φ, or convincingly unconscious systems with high Φ, would falsify the identity claim.