Reality is fundamentally physical
All that exists is physical, and every phenomenon — including mind — is ultimately constituted by physical processes described (in principle) by physics.
2 open contradictions
- Evidential: These hypotheses draw opposite conclusions from the same evidence. Conflicts with Consciousness is not reducible to physical processes.
- Evidential: These hypotheses draw opposite conclusions from the same evidence. Conflicts with Consciousness is integrated information (IIT).
Evidence balance
Supporting
2- Neural correlates of consciousnessw75
Crick & Koch · 1998 · Peer-reviewed
Tight, manipulable mind–brain dependence is what physicalism predicts.
- The physical basis of mind (Crick)w60
Francis Crick · 1994 · Book
A reductive neuroscience program presupposes physicalism.
Opposing
1- The explanatory-gap argumentw65
David J. Chalmers · 1995 · Philosophical argument
The explanatory gap is the central challenge to physicalism.
Assumptions
A complete physics is possible in principle
unjustified — We do not have one; quantum gravity is missing.
Subjective experience is physically constitutable
unjustified — This is exactly what the hard problem disputes.
Open questions within this hypothesis
- Can physicalism account for the qualitative character of experience?
- Does the measurement problem require non-physical ingredients? (Most say no.)
Falsification criteria
A demonstrated phenomenon that resists any physical description even in principle — e.g. a rigorously established mental effect with no physical correlate — would falsify it.