Domain
State of the field
Neuroscience maps ever-finer correlates of experience, but the "hard problem" — why there is something it is like to be a system at all — has no consensus explanation.
Subjective experience is a basic feature of reality not fully explained by, or derivable from, physical facts about the brain.
A system is conscious to the degree that it possesses integrated information (Φ); experience is identical to a maximally irreducible cause–effect stru…
Chalmers argues that functional and physical explanations address the "easy problems" but leave unexplained why those processes are accompanied by subjective ex…
Specific, manipulable neural activity reliably tracks the contents of conscious experience, supporting a tight dependence of mind on brain.
IIT proposes that consciousness corresponds to integrated information (Φ) in a system, yielding quantitative, in-principle-testable predictions about which syst…
Crick's programmatic claim that mental states are wholly the behaviour of neurons motivates a reductive, physicalist research program for consciousness.
Penrose argues that human mathematical insight exceeds any algorithm, suggesting consciousness involves physics beyond standard computation — a much-criticized…